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Recent Cases
vealed that mere installation does not
constitute physical injury to property.
First, Judge Cudahy contended that the
words "physical injury" must be given
a literal, plain sense meaning. The
judge further argued that the purpose
of insurance does not extend to risks
that were not bargained for ahead of
time. In addition, the court noted that
the relevant parties for interpreting the
language of the contract are Eljer, Liberty, and Travelers, and not the drafters
of the CGL standard policy. *

In Citizens and Southern National
Bank v. Thomas B. Hamilton Co.,
969 F.2d 1013 (11th Cir. 1992), the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that a merchant
bank could not terminate a credit card
agreement with a merchant who had
filed for reorganization under chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The court
affirmed the decisions of the bankruptcy court and the district courts in
finding that the agreement in question
did not have the primary purpose of
providing financial accommodations,
and therefore the bank could not terminate it after a bankruptcy filing.

parties, which usually amounted to 96
percent of the transaction amount.
C & S paid Hamilton within a few days
of the purchase by direct deposit into a
commercial checking account that
Hamilton maintained at C & S. The
bank would then present the sales
drafts to the card-issuing bank, which
would arrange for a transfer of funds
from MasterCard or Visa to C & S, and
bill the cardholder for the amount of
the purchase.
In the event that a valid cardholder
disputed an item on his bill, the cardissuing bank would have a right of
chargeback against the merchant bank,
in this case C & S. The agreement
between C & S and Hamilton provided
that under certain circumstances C & S
would be able to pass this chargeback
on to Hamilton. Situations in which
C & S would have this right included
returned merchandise, illegible sales
drafts, and any other situation which
may have been caused by Hamilton.
The agreement provided three ways for
C & S to protect itself from being billed
for a chargeback that Hamilton could
not or would not cover: it could deduct
amounts owed from Hamilton's checking account; it could demand prompt
payment for the chargeback amount; or
it could hold a portion of the payments
it owed Hamilton on reserve to cover
future chargebacks.
In June 1989, Hamilton filed for
chapter 11 reorganization. C & S
required Hamilton to reapply for a
credit card merchant agreement and
rejected its application because of
Hamilton's uncertain financial future.

Credit Card Merchant Agreement
Thomas B. Hamilton Co., Inc.
("Hamilton") was a retail merchant
which had an ongoing credit card agreement with Citizens and Southern National Bank ("C & S"). This agreement
allowed Hamilton to accept the
MasterCard or Visa credit cards presented by its customers. C & S, as the
merchant bank, would purchase the
sales drafts from these retail transactions at a discount agreed to by both

The Dispute
Section 365(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code does not allow a party to an
executory contract to terminate that
contract solely because of another
party's bankruptcy filing, unless the
contract is "a contract to make a loan,
or extend other debt financing orfinancial accommodations, to or for the
benefit of the debtor, or to issue a
security of the debtor." C & S argued
that the credit card agreement was an
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extension of financial accommodations
by C & S to Hamilton, and the bank
could therefore terminate it upon
Hamilton's bankruptcy filing. Hamilton contended that the agreement was
not a contract for financial accommodations, and therefore Hamilton's
trustee in bankruptcy could assume it.
Not a Contractto Extend Financial
Accommodations
The court looked both at precedent
and at the legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Code in concluding that
the agreement between Hamilton and
C & S was not a contract to extend
financial accommodations. The court
determined that the term "financial
accommodations" should be narrowly
construed to mean "the extension of
money or credit to accommodate another." In defining the term this way,
the court said a distinction must be
made between contracts whose primary
purpose was to extend some sort of
credit and contracts in which some
extension of credit was merely incidental to a larger purpose.
Here, the court found that the agreement between Hamilton and C & S was
for the sale of credit card sales drafts.
Hamilton could sell its products to
credit card customers, and C & S could
make a small profit on these sales as the
merchant bank. The real credit was
extended from the credit card issuing
bank to the consumer; the issuing bank
bore the risk of nonpayment of a valid
charge by a consumer. The terms of the
agreement between C & S and Hamilton
did not contemplate any extension of
credit from C & S to Hamilton. Any
credit that may have been extended to
Hamilton in this arrangement was incidental to the larger purposes of the
agreement.
The court further noted that there
was not a significant risk that C & S
would be harmed by a continuing relationship with Hamilton. The two parties had enjoyed a good relationship for
several years, and Hamilton did not
owe C & S any money. The court
reminded C & S that the terms of the
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agreement provided a number of ways
for C & S to protect itself against
nonpayment of chargebacks by
Hamilton. Finally, the court stated that
if C & S could demonstrate that remaining a party to the contract with
Hamilton would place it at unreasonable risk, then the bankruptcy court
could protect C & S from future defaults.
The court based its conclusions on
public policy considerations and noted
that this type of credit card merchant
agreement was very common among
all types of retail businesses. Therefore, if these agreements could not be
assumed by a trustee in bankruptcy, it
would be virtually impossible for a
struggling retail store to financially
rehabilitate itself. The court thus held
that the credit card merchant agreement was not a contract to extend
financial accommodations and therefore was not one which the bank could
terminate upon a bankruptcy filing. 4o
-
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State Consumer Protection

Agency May Regulate
Correspondence from Outof-State Solicitors
In ConsumerProtection Div. v. Outdoor World Corp., 603 A.2d 1376
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992), the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that
the Maryland Consumer Protection
Agency could regulate communications
sent to state residents that violated the
Consumer Protection Act ("Act"). The
court held that the Maryland Consumer
Protection Agency could not limit or
control high pressure sales practices
that occurred entirely outside its borders.
Vague Prize Notices and High
Pressure Sales Tactics
Outdoor World Corporation
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("OWC"), a Pennsylvania Corporation, sold memberships in campgrounds
it owned in Pennsylvania and Virginia.
Through the mailing of notices to Maryland residents, OWC solicited sales of
campground membership. OWC began soliciting Maryland residents in
1984, and in the ten month period from
November 1988 to September 1989,
mailed approximately six million notices. The notices, however, contained
alias corporate names and never mentioned OWC or the campsites. Instead,
the notices stated that the recipient had
definitely won at least one prize from
those listed in the notice and alluded
that the recipient could win or already
had won a very valuable prize. However, in order to claim the prize, the
"winner" had to appear at a particular
location, invariably an OWC campground.
When the "winners" arrived at the
campgrounds, OWC required them to
take a campground tour before receiving the prize. Furthermore, throughout
the visit, the OWC salesmen subjected
the consumers to a lengthy and aggressive sales pitch designed to induce them
to purchase a campground membership. The tour and sales pitch lasted
almost a full day. Additionally, when
OWC finally awarded the prizes, they
were generally of little value and often
required payment of a redemption fee.
Approximately 43,000 Marylanders visited OWC sites since 1986 and
about 5,000 of them purchased campsite memberships, garnering OWC
about $60,000,000.
State Agency Charges Seller
In May 1989, Maryland's Consumer
Protection Division ("Division")
charged OWC with false and misleading solicitations, and unfair and deceptive sales tactics in violation of the Act.
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §13301 et. seq. (1991).
The first charge concerned the content of the notice sent to Maryland
residents. The Division alleged that
OWC failed to mention the tour requirement, the redemption fees, the

I

value of the prizes, the odds of winning, and the membership scheme.
Furthermore, the Division stated that
the use of aliases gave the false impression that OWC had particular sponsors
or affiliations.
The second charge concerned
OWC's conduct at the campsites. The
Division asserted that OWC's statements regarding campground facilities, membership price, and membership contracts were misleading and
deceptive. The Division also contended that the length of the tour violated the Act.
The Chief of the Division adopted
the hearing officer's conclusion that
OWC committed all the violations for
which it was charged and entered a
final administrative order. The injunctive portion of th order placed restrictions on the tours and high pressure
sales tactics exercised at the campgrounds. It also provided that those
who paid a redemption fee would get a
full refund and that those who had
received a redemption certificate, but
had not yet paid, were entitled to collect their prizes without payment.
Under the order, OWC would provide
lists and funding for the Division to
notify the consumers of their respective rights and refund the required
amounts. Furthermore, the injunctive
order required that future correspondence sent to Maryland residents must
comply with the Act.
The restitution portion of the order
allowed any Maryland resident who
purchased a membership after 1984 to
rescind the contract and receive a refund. However, to qualify for the
refund, the Maryland consumer must
have visited a campground in response
to a mail solicitation and gone on a tour
or listened to a sales presentation to obtain
a prize.
OWC appealed the order to the Circuit Court for Baltimore. The circuit
court held that the final order exceeded
the Division's jurisdiction because the
conduct it sought to regulate occurred
entirely out-of-state. Despite acknowledging that the notices were mislead57

